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Bakery And Confectionary Workers' International Union of America
Local 468 v. White Lunch Ltd. et al. [1966] S.C.R. 282.
LABOUR LAW-ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-
RETROACTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS - B.C. LABOUR RELATIONS
ACT s. 65 (3).
Introduction
The recent White Lunch case1 is the culmination of a needlessly
long labour dispute.2 The decision of the Supreme Court rests on a
simple matter of statutory interpretation; however, it is apparent
from the facts that the court did not wish to involve itself in some
very interesting problems. It is of some significance that this decision,
which seemed obvious to the Supreme Court, was a complete reversal
of the case's history in the lower courts.
Facts
The facts of the case are quite complex and since the time
sequence is of importance it may be useful to set out the facts3 in the
following table:
Background: The prosecutor, seeking to have the B.C. Labour Relations
Board's orders quashed, was White Lunch Ltd. White Lunch had exten-
sive restaurant operations in the Vancouver area. The business was
operated through a maze of corporations. Clancy's Pastries Ltd. was
part of the White Lunch organization, supplying baked goods for the
restaurants. The two companies had the same individual shareholders,
president, general manager, and solicitor.
September 26, 1962: The union, local 468, made an application for certifi-
cation as the bargaining agent for the employees in the bakery depart-
ment of White Lunch. The Board sent notice of the application to White
Lunch.
October 1: The solicitor for White Lunch (and Clancy's) sent a letter to
the Board acknowledging receipt of the notice, but stating that White
Lunch had no bakery department, that the baking was done by Clancy's
and that the application should be directed against Clancy's. The next
day the Board sent notice of an application for certification to Clancy's.
October 12: The Solicitor for the companies represented to the Board that
a rumor that the Clancy's company would close down was untrue.
October 16: The Board certified the union as bargaining agent for the
employees of Clancy's. There had apparently been a start to negotia-
tions before this on or about Oct. 10; there were already complaints
of unfair labour practices.
1 Bakery and Confectionary Workers' International Union, Local 468 v.
White Lunch Ltd. et al. [1966J S.C.R. 282, 56 D.L.R. (2d) 193. For the trial
decision see 42 D.L.R. (2d) 364 (B.C.S.C.). The appeal to the B.C.C.A. is
reported in 51 D.LR (2d)72
2 The judicial history of the case lasted from Sept. 26, 1962, when the
union applied for certification, until the decision of the Supreme Court was
handed down on Jan. 25, 1966, a period of three and one-third years. However,
as in most labour disputes, one suspects that the actual struggle was over
when the interim injunction was granted to White Lunch on Dec. 13, 1962.
The decision of the Supreme Court is probably only a paper victory for the
union.
3 The facts are mainly taken from the decision of Mr. Justice Hall in
the Supreme Court, with some of the facts being obtained from the decisions
of the lower courts.
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November 8: The hearing of the unfair labour practices was held and the
Board made three orders; Clancy's was ordered to cease intimidating
the workers and to reinstate two workers and pay them wages lost
because of their having been discharged.
November 24: The shareholders of Clancy's, (in a meeting which required
14 days notice), voted to wind-up voluntarily the Clancy's company, and
the employees were discharged.
February 13, 1963: The Board held a hearing as a result of which the
previous orders against Clancy's were changed so that the certification
as well as the unfair practice orders were to operate against White Lunch
instead of the company which no longer existed.
The discharged employees picketed White Lunch on December 7,
1962. White Lunch then sought an injunction and a declaration
that it was not the employer of the picketers. It was at the hearing for
an interim injunction on Dec. 13 that the union and the Board first
found out that Clancy's was no longer in existence and that it had
been wound-up on the day when the workers had been discharged.
The interim injunction was obtained, and the trial for the permanent
injunction and the declaration was ordered to be held as soon as
possible. However, before the trial, the union sought to have the
previous orders of the Board varied. The orders were varied at the
hearing on February 13. White Lunch then brought the issue before
the courts, seeking a judicial review of the Board's power to change
previous orders. Both the British Columbia Supreme Court and Court
of Appeal found that the Board did not have this power. The Supreme
Court of Canada reversed their findings and held that this action
was within the statutory power given to the Labour Relations Board.
The finding by the Court that the Board had jurisdiction to
make the orders in question rests upon the judicial interpretation
of the word "vary" as it appears in s. 65 (3) of the Labour Relations
Act.4 Upon a reading of the facts it is evident that the real reason
for the decision to allow the Board to vary the orders was because
of the way in which the Board and the union had been misled by
the representations of the solicitor of the companies. Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to discuss the
standard of conduct necessary when dealing with a quasi-judicial
body. Further, when considered in conjunction with what appears in
the judgments in the lower courts, there is an even more fundamental
problem raised. The Board was chastised by the trial judge5 for
holding the hearing while the same issue was before the court in the
injunction proceeding. Just who was usurping whose jurisdiction is a
difficult problem to determine, but the important point is that in this
4 Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1960 c. 205 as amended by 1961 c. 31
s. 37(c). The section reads:
65(3). "The Board may, upon the petition of any employer, employers'
organization, trade-union, or other person, or of its own motion, recon.
sider any decision or order made by it under this Act, and may vary or
cancel any such decision or order, and for the purposes of the Act the
certification of a trade-union is a decision of the Board."
The Ontario Labour Relations Board has the same power; see Labour
Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960 c. 202 s. 79(1)
5 See 42 D.L.R. (2d) 364 at 369 for a rather emotional outburst.
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area there are two adjudicators available to the parties. Thus, as a
result of the dispute in this case, there is an injunction and declar-
ation of the British Columbia Supreme Court that White Lunch is not
the employer and a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada holding
that White Lunch is the employer of the workers.
In the Supreme Court of British Columbia
Judicial review of the Board's orders of February 13, 1963 was
started by White Lunch on a motion of certiorari. At trial the orders
were quashed. The basis of the court's decision was that these orders
were of a retroactive nature and would "saddle White Lunch Ltd. (a
stranger to the proceedings of November 8, 1962) with responsibility
for the financial and other obligations of Clancy's which the Board
thought existed during the corporate existence of Clancy's. ' '6 The
issue of retroactivity is only mentioned by Sullivan J. The Board
had relied on the power to vary previous orders given in s. 65(3)
of the Labour Relations Act. A variance of previous orders had been
allowed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Oliver Co-operative
case,7 but the court here found that case "easily distinguishable".8
Surely the crucial problem here is what is meant by "vary" in
s. 65 (3). It could mean that the Board has power to change a previous
order but that the changed order is only effective from the date of
the hearing to change it, or that the Board could vary the results of a
previous order retroactively to the date of the original order.
The other part of Mr. Justice Sullivan's argument is that White
Lunch was not a party to the earlier proceedings. Without disturbing
the classical "corporate veil" theory, this may very well be the case.
However, since Clancy's and White Lunch had the same shareholders
and managers it is difficult to believe that White Lunch did not have
actual notice of the hearing against Clancy's.
The Supreme Court (British Columbia) was also gravely con-
cerned that because the issue before the Board involved a decision
as to whom was the real employer of the workers in question, and
that since there were injunction proceedings before the court by
White Lunch against the union, the Board was being discourteous to
the British Columbia Supreme Court in hearing the matter at this
time. The concern is no doubt similar to that felt by administrative
tribunals with respect to judicial review in spite of privative sections
of statutes. In the end such jurisdictional disputes are a form of
political activity which is no longer expected from the judiciary.
6 Ibid., at 368-9
7 Labour Relation Board of B.C. et al. v. Oliver Co-operative Growers
Exchange and Okanagon Federated 9hipping Ass'n. [19633 S.C.R. 7, 35 D.L.R.
(2d) 694.
8 42 D.L.R. (2d) at 369, the case was dismissed in just these words, see
Infra, footnote 12.
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In the British Columbia Court of Appeal
In the British Columbia Court of Appeal the decision of Shep-
pard J.A.9 is based completely on the finding that the word "vary"
as it is used in s. 65(3) does not include the power to vary retro-
actively, and that the Board had exceeded its statutory powers and
the writ of certiorari would lie. He did not refer to the injunction
proceedings. However, Bull J.A. did mention these and decided that
they ought to be completely ignored since they were irrelevant to the
finding of want of jurisidiction. He also based his decision on the
meaning of the word "vary", noting that it was within the Board's
power only to vary the orders effective from the date of the second
hearing.
Before going on to consider the reasoning of the Supreme Court,
let us consider what has happened so far. By hiding under the separate
corporate entities of the two companies, the managers of White Lunch
have not only successfully dodged a certification proceeding10 but also
they have managed to get rid of the pro-union employees permanently,
in blatant contravention of the protection afforded workers under any
statute which encourages collective bargaining.1 The case was inter-
preted in the lower courts as a bona fide closing down of the bakery; in
fact, it is a not too well hidden variation of the "runaway shop". To
saddle the Board with a theory of corporate identity from company
law, when it is dealing with industrial relationships that it defines in
a realistic and functional way, is the height of absurdity. So far all
we have seen is another argument for the proposition that the courts
ought to keep out of such a specialized field, or if they insist on
playing watchdog, then they ought not to try to import obsolete or
irrelevant law.
In the Supreme Court of Canada
The decision of the Supreme Court is short and to the point. After
setting out the facts the court comments that the Labour Relations
Act is not to be narrowly construed as a derogation of common law
rights, but as a conscious altering of the common law by the legislature
in the light of the Industrial Revolution. Once the scope of the inter-
pretation is determined there is little left of the case. The interpre-
tation of "vary" is the same as that in the Oliver Co-operative case,12
the Board having an independent power to vary former orders.
Furthermore, the Board under this power to vary has the final and
9 51 D.L.R. (2d) 72.
10 They would presumably be certified at least from the time of the
second hearing, if the variation is to be prospective only.
11 See R.S.B.C. 1960 c. 205 s. 4 and R.S.O. 1960 c. 202, s. 48 to s. 59b, In
particular s. 50.
12 In that case the Board had varied previous certifications, changing
them so that a larger union, formed out of a series of locals, was certified in
place of the various locals. The variance was, in effect, a short-cut to going
through the complete certification procedure again. Because the problem was
not raised by the successor union the issue of retroactivity was not raised in
that case. It is, however, a latent matter; there is the possible problem as to




conclusive decision. There were no defects in natural justice at the
hearing of February 13, since the interested parties had notice and
were allowed to speak on the issue of varying the original orders. The
fact that the operation of the order may be retroactive is not a denial
of justice:
... circumstances will frequently arise where it must have a retroactive
effect. The present case is a classical example.13
Analysis
Was the meaning which the Board gave to the word "vary" really
as terrible as the lower courts suggested? There is a similar use of
the word "vary" in common legal usage. Suppose that a writ has been
issued with the name of the party defendant incorrectly spelled, the
Statute of Limitations subsequently preventing the issuance of a new
writ before the error has been discovered. It is quite obvious that the
plaintiff can have the original writ varied so as to have the correct
spelling put on the writ.1 4 This is a variance of the writ dated back
to the date of the original writ. There is no issue of retroactivity
here; this is merely the correction of a mistake. There is a
general qualification that such variations should not be allowed to
work injustice. We are, however, dealing with more than a spelling
mistake in this case.
Hanging over the whole of this discussion is the reference by the
courts to "retroactivity". There are few words so emotionally charged
as this when dealing with the "justice" of any judicial decision. If
the Board uses its power to vary incorrectly by making an order
that is retroactive, then nothing, not even the consent of the parties,
would give the Board jurisdiction where it has none and the writ of
certiorari would properly lie.
The use of this word in the judgments betrays a failure to make
a fundamental and obvious distinction concerning retroactivity. The
common problem is with respect to the interpretation of a statute
and whether that statute operates retroactively, i.e. whether it is to
affect the law for times prior to its enactment. 5 There is, of course,
the general presumption that statutes are to operate prospectively
from the date that they are brought into force. However, this is not
the type of problem which is raised by the Board's interpretation of
the word "vary". It is not the interpretation of s. 65(3) that is
retroactive, since the section was brought into force by an amend-
ment to the Act in 1961 long before the actions of the parties in
question.
What the courts seemed to be concerned with is the fact that the
Board interpreted "vary" so that it could change the status or rights
of the parties as of *an earlier date, i.e. the date at which the parties
first came before the Board. This, though, is not to interpret the
'3 [1966] S.C.R. at 295, 56 D.L.R. (2d) at 204.
'4 See, for example, Williamson v. Headley [1950] O.W.N. 185.
15 This is the sort of thing that Sheppard, J.A. is dealing with at 51
D.L.R. (2d) 75-6.
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statute retroactively; it is merely to change the rights of the parties
at some previous date. Clearly this is nothing startling, but merely
a function of any adjudication. Thus, when a court decides that a
contract has been breached, it does not say that from the date of the
trial the contract is in a state of breach. It in effect declares that at
a certain previous time, the defendant breached the contract. There
is nothing wrong with this, for all adjudication is based on past
conduct and raises no problem of retroactivity. The crucial distinc-
tion is that the fear of retroactivity applies to the state of the Zaw
at the time when people act on it, not to the activities of the people
themselves.
The fear of retroactivity is not simply that it affects vested rights,
(all new laws do this), but that it puts the citizen in the position that
at a given time it is impossibe for him to determine the legal effect
of his conduct. This must not be confused with whether or not he is
able to decide what the legal consequences of his conduct are; it is
because of such difficulties that people seek the advice of lawyers. The
problem is that no amount of legal prediction can determine the legal
effect since the law itself is made after the activity.
It may be that what is objected to is that the legal state of affairs
was decided by the Board when it certified Clancy's and now the Board
is changing that state of the law. The issue of certification having been
decided and Clancy's wound-up, why should there now be a new
hearing on the same matter? Otherwise, how is one ever to act after
a decision of the Board if they can at some later time change their
mind? However, White Lunch is not really in a position to avail itself
of this argument. It is not unreasonable to say that White Lunch
intended the reasonable and probable consequences of its activity.
The obvious consequence of the solicitor's letter 16 to the Board was
that the union and the Board would end up dealing with the wrong
party, with a comany that was about to be wound-up, or which could
be wound-up easily and against which any orders would be of no value.
Such a misleading of the tribunal, presumably intentional, is hardly
a laudable activity. That such activity should be allowed to deprive
the workers who were fired from the statutory protection given their
jobs would hardly be justice. But this pattern of activity came to light
only after the original orders had been made. Thus, the reopening
of the previous hearings was to correct the error which the tribunal
had made as a result of the prosecutor's conduct. There is no doubt
that a court would not allow such a fraud to be committed against it.
Why then should the Board, as an adjudicative body, be forced to let
such misconduct create an effective block to the operation of the
statute that created it?
16 The conduct of the solicitor is interesting. If they claim to be separate
corporate entities here, is he not faced with a conflict of interests? In whose
best interests was he acting when he made the assurance that Clancy's was
not going to close? In fact, it is impossible to understand the conduct of the
solicitor unless we regard the two companies as one entity.
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Perhaps what the courts were trying to get at was the notion
that White Lunch had no notice of the previous hearing. It was
pointed out that, apart from White Lunch's representation to the
Board that Clancy's was really the party they were after, the White
Lunch company, by virtue of the people involved, was certainly aware
of the events of the first hearing.17 They really cannot say that they
had no notice or opportunity to attend the first hearing, since they
were in fact there.
The case does raise an interesting theoretical problem. The
Supreme Court has in effect said that White Lunch is the employer
of the discharged workers. However, White Lunch has an injunction
and a declaration of the British Columbia Supreme Court that they
are not employers. What is the status of the injunction and the
declaration? It is impliedly overruled by the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada, but do they need to have the injunction formally
dissolved? Would they be in contempt of the British Columbia court
for following a decision of the Supreme Court? This duality of legal
status results from the acceptability of two approaches to the same
problem. If this duality is to be removed from the law, it is doubtful
that the Labour Relations Board would be the one to lose jurisdiction.
Conc~usion
This case supplies us with a judicial interpretation of the meaning
of the word "vary" as it applies to administrative tribunals, at least
to Labour Relations Boards. This meaning is broad enough to be
consistent with the adjudicative character of many of these boards.
However, the case does not go far enough in concerning itself
with the conduct of the prosecutor (White Lunch) in trying to evade
the effect of the Labour Relations Act by means of a misrepresenta-
tion. That a person should be able to hide behind a misrepresentation
in an adjudication is something that the courts should not hesitate
to deal with. Up until now, judicial concern with tribunals has been
limited to protecting individuals from improper adjudications. How-
ever, the concern with adjudication ought to go the other way as well.
The courts ought to have an interest in seeing that adjudication
itself is not allowed to be the victim of sham by the parties being
heard. When a tribunal is adjudicating, surely a "contempt" of the
tribunal is as dangerous to the judicial process as is a contempt of the
court.
Cynically, the real facts of the case are that not only did White
Lunch manage to deceive the union and the Board, it successfully
made a mockery of the law and the courts. Three years after the
dispute arose, Mr. Justice Hall, in finally resolving the matter, said:
17 Labour Relations Board of B.C. et a7. v. Traders' Service Ltd. [19581
S.C.R. 672 is an example of a similar case. Here two inter-related companies
were also involved. They also pleaded this independent corporate ignorance
of the other's affairs. The Supreme Court of Canada refused to accept this
as grounds for quashing a certification. There were, however, two dissents
in this case, both of which relied on a strict theory of corporate identity.
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